Abstract: Based on the data of a-share State-owned listed companies from 2008 to 2021, this paper explores the impact of Non-state-owned shareholders over-appointing directors on the digital transformation of State-owned enterprises. The findings are as follows: Non-state-owned shareholders’ over-appointment of directors can significantly improve the Stateowned enterprises’ digital transformation level, and it can be achieved by strengthening innovation ability, promoting equity incentive and easing financing constraints; Heterogeneity test shows that the above-mentioned relationship is more significant in local soes, competitive industries and soes with high attention in capital market; The expansion analysis shows that when Non-state-owned shareholders over-appoint directors, the value-creation effect of State-owned enterprises’ digital transformation is prominent. The article enriches the research category of Non-state-owned shareholder governance, and provides a theoretical basis for State-owned enterprises to improve the level of digitization and achieve higher quality development.