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四方演化博弈视角下优质医疗资源下沉的协同机制分析

An Analysis of Collaborative Mechanisms for the Decentralisation of High-Quality Healthcare Resources from a Quadripartite Evolutionary Game Perspective

  • 摘要: 优质医疗资源下沉作为“健康中国”战略的核心举措,面临资源分布倒金字塔化、协同机制梗阻及患者就医选择偏好固化等实践困境。通过构建四方演化博弈模型,刻画政府、三级医院、基层医疗机构与患者在有限理性下的策略互动,并深入探究其协同条件与作用机理。通过建立复制动态方程和稳定性分析,识别系统演化的均衡状态与关键阈值条件,进行多情景仿真与参数灵敏度检验,以揭示系统演化规律及政策干预的有效路径。研究结果表明:(1)三级医院下沉成本、政府直接补贴与品牌收益构成了决定系统走向的“核心驱动三角”,且三者间存在强烈的非线性耦合与共振效应;(2)系统演化存在显著的“激励错配”风险,单向向基层倾斜的财政补贴不仅无法通过传导机制有效激活供给端,反而会因挤占前者的专项资金空间而触发三级医院的策略退缩;(3)患者行为表现出极强的理性选择刚性,其对基层的隐性信任损失感知构成了制约资源下沉效能的终端瓶颈。基于模型推演的数学阈值与全局稳健性检验,从供给侧长效驱动、防挤出财政补偿、数字治理与需求侧引导三个维度提出系统性政策建议,为推动优质医疗资源高效下沉、构建多方共赢格局提供理论依据与决策支持。

     

    Abstract: The decentralisation of high-quality healthcare resources, a core initiative of the Healthy China strategy, faces practical challenges, including the inverted pyramid distribution of resources, obstructed coordination mechanisms, and entrenched patient preferences for healthcare choices. The present study examines the paradigm shift from "unidirectional decentralisation" to "multi-stakeholder win-win" in this process. The construction of a four-party evolutionary game model enables the depiction of the strategic interactions among the government, tertiary hospitals, primary healthcare institutions, and patients under the framework of bounded rationality. This study also explores the conditions for collaboration and the underlying mechanisms that facilitate it. The equilibrium states and critical threshold conditions of system evolution are identified through the replication of dynamic equations and stability analysis. Multi-scenario simulations and parameter sensitivity tests have been used to reveal the system's evolutionary patterns and effective pathways for policy intervention. The findings indicate the following: Firstly, government regulatory costs, fiscal compensation, and stakeholder participation willingness have been shown to significantly influence evolutionary trajectories and convergence rates, revealing an 'incentive duality paradox'. Secondly, enhanced participation willingness among tertiary hospitals has been demonstrated to generate an 'incentive substitution effect'. Thirdly, patient behaviour exhibits rigid characteristics, significantly constraining the lack of trust in primary care. In order to resolve these coordination dilemmas and enhance the effectiveness of resource decentralisation, systematic policy recommendations will be proposed across four dimensions: dynamic incentive design, optimisation of the government's role, restructuring of fiscal mechanisms, and cultivation of trust capital. This provides theoretical foundations and decision support for promoting the efficient decentralisation of high-quality healthcare resources and establishing a multi-stakeholder win-win framework.

     

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